ANALYSIS REQUIREMENTS

FAILURE MODE and EFFECTS ANALYSIS
The FMEA will be appended to this document.
WHAT IF ANALYSIS
The What-if will be appended to this document.
HAZARD ANALYSIS
The Hazards analysis is in the form of an ODH analysis, 3740.510 -EN-258, D. Clark and J. Michael.
ENGINEERING CALCULATIONS
RELIEF DEVICE ADEQUACY
The adequacy of relief devices is addressed in 1.1.S above.
STRESS LEVELS
Flexibility and stress calculations for the cryostat piping are documented in DO Engineering Note 3740.210-EN-2S.
OTHER CALCUlATIONS
The only warm structural component having safety implications is the carriage which supports the cryostat on the center beam of the platform. The carriage is a welded structure designed in accordance with the rules of the AISC Specification for Structural Steel for Build ings (by hand calculations). The design was then analyzed for deflec tions using finite element methods, which also served to verifiy the stress levels in the stuctural members. Upon delivery, the carriage was load-tested to 125~ of its design loading and deflections were measured at the design load. The design and the finite element analysis are contained in Engineering Note 3740.21S-EN-14, and the measured deflec tions are documented in Appendix A of Engineering Note 3740.214-EN-I03. These Notes were submitted for review to the Cryosafety Review Panel as part of the standard documentation procedure and were accepted by the Panel on 3-30-87 and 12-18-87. The Notes were not submitted to the Mech anical Safety Review Panel for their approval.
MAINTAINING SAFE OPERATION
DOCUMENTS
The DO cryogroup has one of the most extensive Engineering Note, Drawing, and Operating Procedures files at the laboratory. It will be maintained and augmented as required to continue this high level of sup port documentation.
PLANS
The DO Cryosystem is monitored and controlled by a TI56S, Pro grammable Logic Controller. All of the sensor and controls work has been designed to support unmanned steady state (exclusive of cooldown) LAr operation. The sysytem is monitored by 1) a link to the main DO cont.rol room, 2) the laboratory FIRUS system, and 3) a cryoexpert autodial iog system. After the initial runnning the experience DO personnel wi I I con duct training and quailfication classes for a broader group of oper~t.ors in RD Cryo. Long term running would be attended, only as required, by this group. The Cryoexperts would continue in their role for the fore seeable future.
•
The designers and builders are training themselves for the ini tial operation. Formal training classes will subsequently be delivered to all potential operators. Only those operators that have successfully completed the formal classes and a rigorous OJT period will be added to the qualified operator list. Cryoexperts wiil be trained as necessary to keep a ready supply on hand for each running period.
The CryoeKpert and lead operators are listed below; NAME EXPERIENCE **** Closed Lose GB-S14H as He gas source Safe GB-S15H, GB-S16H, and GB-219H backup GB-S14H.
MV 802
Closed Lose GB-S15H as He gas source Safe GB-S14H, GB-S16H, and GB-219H backup GB-S15H.
MV 803
Normal Safe Closed Lose GB-S16H as He gas source Safe GB-S14H, GB-S15H, and GB-219H backup GB-S16H.
MV 804
Isolates GB-S14H and GB-S15H Safe GB-S16H and GB-219H provide He gas to PV-219A.
MV 805 H Open
Normal Safe Closed Isolates GB-S16H Safe GB-S14H, GB-S15H, and GB-219H provide He gas to PV-219i\. Isolates GB-S14H and GB-S15H Safe GB-S16H and GB-219H provide He gas to PV-219A.
PRV 809 H Set too high PSV-S07H on GHe line relieves Safe Closed Isolates GB-S16H Safe GB-S14H, GB-S15H, and GB-219H provide He gas to PV-219A.
PI 810 H fails Wrong indo of He gas bottle press, Safe Valves of gas bottles will be closed prior to disconnecting them.
PI 811 H fails Wrong indo of He gas bottle press, Safe Valves of GB-S16H will be closed prior to disconnecting it. There is a loss of signals or valve We would lose the ability to control valves.
All control valves fail in the closed positions. All reliefs and rupture discs operators?
• remain operational. After some lime trapped volume reliefs could relieve.
A call on an EC rotalinQ bayonet is Would not be able to successfull~ pass pump. and
The CC could relieve also after a long period of time.
It is written into the CC procedures pump and puroe section 7.3.0 that missing or Is not clamped on? purge part of the ee procedures. the caps are to be installed. If a cap is missing we would not successfully be able to pull a vacuum on that line. I! a cap was in place but not clamped, then It would become unseated aller the first backfill to positive pressure and the subsequent pumpdown would fail. In either case the problem would be discovered belore crYOQens entered the line. There is a loss of electrical Backup power will be required to maintain Sustained loss of electrical power will result in critical equipment Ipower?
operation of the system. running on the Emergency Power Generator. The instrument air, vacuum pumps and controls are (will) all be EPG powered. Should the EPG fail before the return of commercial power the equipment is lost. see below.
There is a loss of Instrument Valves will close. Safe. The primary system is backed up for several hours with a tube trailer. air?
All valves are failsafe. I.e. the~ close on the loss of instrument air. Reference the failure mode and effects analysis.
There is a loss of cooling The main cooling water supply might be The vacuum and Instrument air equipment have a primary, emergency water?
in leopardy if a system was not designed I powered. immediate start, closed loop. fan blown radiator. redundant Iproperly.
Ipump, glycol stream to put the heat load on the building system and Iprovide lower summertime coolant temperatures. Loss 01 the secondary system. or commercial power if the emergency generator functions, does not ellect the cooling provided to the rotary ~gui~ment.
There is a loss of Liquid Cooling will be lost and will cause the The loss of liquid nitrogen denies the detector its necessary coooling nitrogen?
Vessels to warm, boil all. and vent. and it will pressurize and vent. The rate of loss is calculated to be only 0.45 gpm of liquid argon on average. which is very slow. The loss 01 liguid nitrogen does not erovide a eersonnel or eguiement danger.
Some kind of contamination The contamination could restrict flows. Continued or serious one-tima contamination of the coolant stream occurs?
with frozen solids will result in a loss 01 liquid nitrogen see above.
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,," Upset of the system may occur.
